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The Economic Status of National Minorities in Europe: a Four-
Case Study 
Jonathan Wheatley 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to investigate the causes and effects of economic exclusion 
of historical national and ethnic minorities and to identify the policies, both at the 
national and supranational levels, that are most effective in combating this problem.  
The study analyzes economic participation in four regions of Europe in which 
historical minorities are concentrated: the Autonomous Province of South 
Tyrol/Bolzano (where German-speakers form a majority), Northern Ireland (where 
Catholics form a large minority), Estonia (where Russians and other Russian-
speakers form a majority in the northeastern county of Ida-Viru) and Transylvania in 
Romania (where Hungarians form a majority in two counties). The main focus is on 
compactly settled minorities, rather than widely dispersed minorities such as Roma. 
The paper (Section II) shows how a variety of factors, including constitutional 
arrangements and other fundamental laws, policies from different fields of policy 
making, general economic processes, such as privatization or integration into the 
global marketplace, as well as the strategies adopted by the minorities themselves, 
affect the relative economic position of members of minorities in the four regions 
under analysis. This allows us to derive examples of best practice in terms of policy 
initiatives that can best combat the problem of economic exclusion. The paper 
concludes by summarizing the policies that are most effective in promoting 
economic inclusion in our case studies and the ways that these may be employed at a 
wider EU level. 
I. Introduction 
Before embarking on an analysis of the causes and effects of the economic exclusion of 
minorities, we must first ask ourselves why we should prioritize the issue of economic 
exclusion of minorities at all. To begin with, we should ask whether historical minorities 
do, in fact, suffer from economic marginalization. If we find that they do not, then there 
is little reason to make this a major issue. We must then ask why, if the economic 
marginalization of minorities does indeed occur, it should be a major policy issue that 
governments and international organizations should take seriously. It is these questions 
that this introduction sets out to address. 
As the abstract (above) makes clear, this paper is not primarily concerned with Europe’s 
Roma population, although in the conclusion some of the special problems faced by 
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Roms are addressed, namely the high vulnerability of Roms to rapid economic change 
and the low economic and educational expectations within Romani communities. While 
Roms are a clear example of an ethnic group that suffers from systematic discrimination 
in terms of economic opportunities, they are in many ways a special case with very 
distinct problems of their own. Most importantly, Roms are a non-territorial nationality, 
to the extent that they are found in virtually all European countries. Moreover, most 
Romani communities in Europe have been highly mobile over the past two centuries and 
have tended not to integrate with the rest of society. For these reasons, they have played 
little or no role in the nation-state-building processes of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Their relative marginalization in society therefore has especially deep roots in a 
way that is not the case with most other national minorities. The policies and factors that 
may influence the degree of economic participation of Roms may therefore not be 
relevant for other minorities. Finally, there is a wealth of literature on the problem of 
Roms’ marginalization and it would not do the subject justice to deal with it in a 
perfunctory manner in this paper.1 
A. Are Members of Europe’s Historical Minorities Excluded Economically? 
The first question we need to address is whether or not national minorities (or, at least, 
certain national minorities) in Europe are, in fact, disadvantaged economically. Although 
the lack of data that are disaggregated according to ethnicity makes it difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which minorities are economically excluded, it is still possible to 
obtain economic data from regions in which minorities are concentrated and this should 
serve as a guide to the economic circumstances faced by the minorities themselves. Table 
1 (below) therefore provides figures for GDP and unemployment in those NUTS regions2  
                                                 
1
 See, for example, publications by the European Roma Rights Centre at 
http://www.errc.org/Publications_index.php, specifically European Roma Rights Centre, The Glass Box: 
Exclusion of Roma from Employment at http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=2727, as well as contributions 
from the UNDP such as UNDP, ‘The Roma in Central and Eastern Europe: Avoiding the Dependency 
Trap’, (Regional Human Development Report, UNDP Bratislava 2002). See also documentation relating to 
the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015, such as that found on the World Bank website, 
http://go.worldbank.org/ELVUPU6V80. 
2
 The Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) is a three-tier hierarchical classification 
developed by the Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) for referencing the 
administrative division of EU countries for statistical purposes. For the candidate countries awaiting 
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Table 1: Economic Status of Minorities in NUTS Regions with a Minority 
Population of over 35% 
 
NUTS Region Minority % GDP per capita (% of national 
average) 2004 
Unemployment 
2004 
United 
Kingdom 
n/a  4.7% 
Northern 
Ireland 
46% Catholic  5.0% 
North 57% Catholic 63% (78% of N. Ireland average) n/a 
West and South 65% Catholic 68% (84% of N. Ireland average) n/a 
Scotland Scots 96% (103% of average outside the 
capital) 
4.5% 
Wales Welsh 78% (84% of average outside the 
capital) 
5.7% 
Spain n/a  11.0% 
Galicia Galicians 80% (85% of average outside the 
capital) 
13.6% 
Pais 
Vasco/Euskadi 
Basques 125% (131% of average outside the 
capital) 
9.7% 
Catalunya Catalans 120% (126% of average outside the 
capital) 
9.7% 
Finland n/a  8.8% 
Aaland Islands 92% Swedish 
speakers 
127% (145% of average outside 
Uusimaa) 
n/a 
Romania 7% Hungarian  8.1% 
Covasna 74% Hungarian 96% (106% of average outside capital) 9.4%* 
Harghita 85% Hungarian 84% (93% of average outside capital) 6.1%* 
Mures 39% Hungarian 104% (115% of average outside capital) 10.5% 
Estonia 26% Russian  9.7% 
Ida-Virumaa 70% Russian 60% (93% of average outside Pohja-
Eesti) 
17.9% 
Italy n/a  8.0% 
Bolzano 69% German 
speakers 
130% (134% of average outside capital) 2.7% 
Greece 1% Muslim  10.5% 
Xanthi 41% Muslim 68% (83% of average outside capital) 10.1% 
Rodopi 52% Muslim 59% (73% of average outside capital) 7.8%* 
Bulgaria 9% Turk  12.0% 
Razgrad 47% Turk 72% (87% of average outside capital) 19.0% 
Latvia 30% Russian  10.4% 
Latgale 43% Russian 46% (76% of average outside capital) 12.7% 
                                                                                                                                                 
accession to the EU, for the other European Economic Area (EEA) countries and for Switzerland, a coding 
of statistical regions that corresponds to the NUTS classification has been defined by Eurostat in agreement 
with the countries concerned. NUTS is a acronym for the French name for the scheme, nomenclature des 
unités territoriales statistiques. 
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Sources: For economic and population data, see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. For breakdown 
according to ethnicity/language, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%85land for the Aaland 
Islands; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muslim_minority_of_Greece for Muslims in Greece (1991); 
http://pub.stat.ee for Estonia (2000); www.insse.ro/rpl2002rezgen/rg2002.htm for Romania; 
www.provincia.bz.it/ASTAT/downloads/Siz_2006-eng.pdf for Provincia Autonoma Bolzano 
(2001); www.nsi.bg/Census_e/Ethnos.htm for Bulgaria (2001); and 
http://data.csb.lv/EN/Database/popcensus/popcensus.asp for Latvia (2000). 
* indicates provisional data. 
of the EU in which minority populations exceed 35%.3 This shows that some minorities 
in Europe clearly do not benefit from the same economic opportunities as their majority 
counterparts, while others enjoy the same living standards or even better. In particular, 
there seems to be little evidence that the so-called ‘regional minorities’ perform badly 
economically: in three cases (the Aaland islands, Catalunya and the Basque country), 
regions associated with a (sub-)national identity perform better than the rest of the 
country, in two cases (Galicia and Wales) they perform worse and, in one case 
(Scotland), economic development is similar to that in the rest of the country. Ethnically 
mixed regions in which ethnic minorities are compactly settled tend to perform rather 
worse; however, South Tyrol (where German-speakers are concentrated) still over-
performs, while the counties of Transylvania (Romania) in which Hungarians are settled 
(Harghita, Covasna and Mures) perform at least as well as other rural areas.  The answer 
to our question of whether or not national minorities in Europe are economically 
disadvantaged is therefore: it depends on a number of factors. 
This paper focuses on four regions in which minorities are compactly settled, including 
two (Catholics in Northern Ireland and Russian-speakers in Estonia) in which the 
minorities in question show signs of being disadvantaged economically and another two 
(Hungarians in Transylvania and German-speakers in South Tyrol) in which they do not. 
These four cases should be particularly illustrative because each pair contains one region 
that has recently undergone radical economic restructuring (from a state-run to a market-
                                                 
3
 Except for the capital city of Latvia, Riga, where the Russian population was 44% in 2000. It was felt that 
the special circumstances in which capital cities find themselves make it impossible to compare them with 
other regions. 
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based economy) and one that has not.  The task of this paper is to investigate why 
economic marginalization has occurred in two regions but not in the other two. The main 
indicator for economic marginalization used in this paper is unemployment; this is 
because unemployment, by its very nature, implies estrangement from the economic 
processes of the country; also, data on income per capita—another indicator of economic 
status—is less widely available at the regional level and is rarely, if ever, disaggregated 
in terms of ethnicity (see below). 
B. Why Does the Economic Exclusion of Minorities Matter? 
The economic marginalization of minorities matters for the following reasons. First of all, 
minorities are a frequently untapped resource in terms of economic prosperity for entire 
communities, not only for members of the minority in question. By making use of the 
intellectual capital that members of minorities have to offer, regions and states regions 
can develop in ways that would not be possible if their skills were left to go to waste. 
Conversely, if minorities remain undereducated, underpaid and underemployed, the 
economy of the entire country or region will suffer, with adverse consequences for 
members of the majority as well. Successful models of multiethnic societies show us that 
ethnic heterogeneity can be associated with prosperity and high living standards across 
the board, provided that the economic potential of all citizens is tapped (see the case of 
the Autonomous Province of Bolzano/South Tyrol below).  
Second, economic prosperity and the reduction of economic inequalities leads to greater 
participation of minorities in public life and, in turn, to a further consolidation of 
democracy. Scholars of democratization often argue that economic development is a 
prerequisite for a consolidated democracy and that this argument is particularly relevant 
in multiethnic societies.4 This is because greater economic opportunities for members of 
national and ethnic minorities can help to break down divisions in society and foster the 
establishment of multiethnic networks (as is the case in Bolzano/South Tyrol). Minority 
                                                 
4
 On the relationship between economic development and democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, Political 
Man: the Social Bases of Politics, expanded edition (Doubleday, New York, 1960); and Larry Diamond, 
“Economic Development of Democracy Reconsidered”, American Behavioral Scientist (1992) No.4/5, 
450–499. 
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communities mired in poverty, on the other hand, are unlikely to accumulate the level of 
social capital necessary to make their voices heard in the political sphere.5 
Third, economic underdevelopment and, especially, the economic marginalization of a 
particular identity group increases the likelihood of interethnic conflict. Various 
development studies have shown that low rates of economic growth and low per capita 
income provide opportunities for potential ‘spoilers’ to engage in intercommunal 
violence.6 In economically underdeveloped regions in which national minorities are 
concentrated, inequalities in living standards and in access to vital yet scarce resources 
can often lead to the exploitation of ethnic networks by political, economic and criminal 
elites for the purposes of racketeering or (in extreme cases) armed actions. Moreover, 
members of minorities that are economically marginalized may come to feel that their 
low economic status is the result of deliberate discrimination on the part of the majority 
or the government, even when it is not.7 This can breed resentment and potentially lead to 
conflict.  
Assuming, then, that the inclusion of minorities into regional, national and global 
economies is important for stability and democracy, let us now look at the factors that 
make this possible. In the following section, I focus on nine such factors insofar as they 
impact upon our four mini case studies: institutional design, education, informal 
networks, cross-border trade, privatization, integration into the national and global 
economies, EU integration, ethnic quotas/monitoring in employment and—last but not 
least—the availability of accurate data on the economic circumstances of minority 
                                                 
5
 According to Robert Putnam, social capital “refers to the collective value of all ‘social networks’ and the 
inclinations that arise from these networks to do things for each other”. Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: the 
Collapse and Revival of American Community (Simon & Schuster, New York, 2000). 
6
 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”, World Bank Working Paper (2001) 
at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedgrievance_23oct.pdf; and Susan E. Rice, 
Corinne Graff and Janet Lewis, “Poverty and Civil War: What Policymakers Need to Know”, Brookings 
Institute Working Paper No.2, at www.brookings.edu. 
7
 Such is the case in the Georgian region of Javakheti. Many Armenians (who make up a majority in 
Javakheti) believe that the dilapidated infrastructure that exists in Javakheti (and in many other more rural 
districts of Georgia as well) is the result of a deliberate policy by the Georgian authorities to force them to 
leave, a process they refer to as ‘white genocide’. See Jonathan Wheatley, “Obstacles Impeding the 
Regional Integration of the Javakheti Region of Georgia”, ECMI Working Paper No. 22, September 2004, 
at www.ecmi.de/download/working_paper_22.pdf. 
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communities. I do not consider the impact of all these factors in all four cases; instead, I 
highlight the factors that are most relevant for each case. 
II. Some Factors Responsible for Inclusion/Exclusion of Minorities 
A.  Institutional Design 
Institutional design refers to the rules according to which power is distributed and 
citizenship rights are bestowed. It is normally determined by fundamental laws, in 
particular by constitutions. Of particular relevance to minorities and their economic rights 
are citizenship laws, language laws, territorial administrative arrangement and election 
laws. All four factors may, in a number of different ways, have a profound impact on the 
economic opportunities of members of national minorities. Out of our four cases, the first 
two factors (citizenship laws and language laws) have had a profound impact on minority 
economic participation in Latvia; the third factor (territorial autonomy) is important in 
South Tyrol/Bolzano; while the fourth factor (election legislation) has played a role in the 
economic marginalization of Catholics in Northern Ireland. 
Estonia (like its neighbour Latvia) has adopted restrictive citizenship laws. Estonian laws 
on citizenship only grant automatic citizenship to persons who were citizens prior to the 
Soviet occupation of 1940 and their descendants. However, many of those living in 
Estonia do not fit into this category as they entered the republic as migrant workers from 
other parts of the USSR during the post-war years. These individuals (mainly ethnic 
Russians) can only become citizens if they fulfill certain requirements, principally by 
passing a naturalization test in which knowledge of the Estonian language is the main 
criterion for success.8 Although a slow process of naturalization has taken place since 
Estonia attained independence, according to a report by the European Commission 
against Racism and Intolerance published in 2005, at the time of writing there were still 
                                                 
8
 There were certain exemptions from the language test, namely for those who did not qualify for Estonian 
citizenship but all the same demonstrated loyalty to the new state—for example, by having applied for 
Estonian citizenship prior to February 1990. Also, from 1998, children born in Estonia after February 1992 
were given the right of citizenship providing their parents had been legally resident in Estonia for five 
years. 
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around 139,000 stateless persons in Estonia, making up 11% of the population.9 While 
this is very significantly down from the figure of 520,000 (nearly 40% of the population) 
when the Law on Citizenship was enacted in 1992,10 it still makes up a significant share 
of the population. 
Despite the fact that they are able to obtain residence permits, can vote in local elections 
and are entitled to a wide range of social benefits, non-citizens in Estonia are clearly 
disadvantaged in the labour market in comparison with citizens. According to a report by 
the Estonian government, far fewer non-citizens than citizens hold posts as managers or 
skilled specialists, although amongst citizens the difference between Estonians and non-
Estonians was much smaller. In 2000, just over 40% of Estonians held posts as managers 
or specialists, compared with about 38% of non-Estonian citizens, 27% of stateless 
persons and less than 20% of Russian citizens resident in Estonia.11 Particularly few 
Russian-speakers work in the more elitist professions within the public sector; in 2001, 
Russian-speakers constituted just 9% of judges and 6% of officers in the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. In addition, there were no Russian-speakers working as officials in the 
Ministries of Justice or Education.12 Moreover, in the city of Narva in Ida-Virumaa, 
where the proportion of (mainly Russian-speaking) non-citizens is estimated at 33%, 
unemployment is particularly high; although unemployment figures for Narva city itself 
are not available, the unemployment rate in Ida-Virumaa has remained nearly twice the 
                                                 
9
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “Third Report on Estonia”, adopted on 24 June 
2005, at http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/ecri/1-ecri/2-country-by-
country_approach/estonia/Estonia%20third%20report%20-%20cri06-1.pdf. 
10
 Margit Sarv, “Integration by Reframing Legislation: Implementation of the Recommendations of the 
OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Estonia, 1993–2001”, Centre for OSCE Research, 
Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, Working Paper No. 7, at 
http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/35_CORE_Working_Paper_7.pdf. 
11
 Government of Estonia, “Implementation of State Programme ‘Integration in Estonian Society 2000–
2007’ in 2000: Report of the Government of Estonia”, May 2001, at 
http://www.riik.ee/saks/ikomisjon/word/report.doc. 
12
 Open Society Institute, “Minority Protection in Estonia: An Assessment of the Programme Integration in 
Estonian Society 2000–2007”, Open Society Institute Report (2002), at 
http://www.eumap.org/reports/2002/minority/international/sections/estonia/2002_m_estonia.pdf. 
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Estonian average since 1999 despite a gradual fall in unemployment throughout Estonia 
and a corresponding increase in economic prosperity.13  
An issue that is related to citizenship is that of language laws; Estonian is the only official 
language in Estonia and, according to an amendment to the Law on Languages passed in 
1999, knowledge of Estonian is required not only for government officials and municipal 
employees but also for the employees of commercial and non-profit organizations and 
institutions, including private businesses. A Language Inspectorate with the capacity to 
impose financial penalties was also set up to monitor compliance with the Law on 
Languages in both the state and private sectors.14 Although this law was further amended 
in June 2000, limiting these requirements in the non-state sector to cases in which the 
public interest is at stake (meaning primarily health and safety), it clearly disqualified 
many Russians-speakers with a weak command of Estonian from a relatively wide range 
of positions.15 Generally speaking, it is likely that language regulations are at least partly 
responsible for the higher levels of unemployment in areas in which Russian-speakers are 
concentrated and for the fact that disproportionately more managers and specialists are 
Estonian-speakers (see above). 
Another crucial factor in terms of institutional design is the relationship between the 
centre and the regions. Here the range of choices extends from a highly centralized 
unitary state with weak local self-government, through various forms of regionalization 
to a fully federal state. Clearly, the greater the level of political and economic 
decentralization the greater the control of local self-governments over the local economy. 
In states in which national minorities are geographically concentrated, such an 
arrangement will give minorities far greater power over economic decision making and, 
all else being equal, will lead to their economic empowerment. The mainly German-
                                                 
13
 According to EUROSTAT figures, unemployment in Estonia fell from 13.6% to 7.9% between 2000 and 
2005. During the same period, unemployment in Ida-Viru County fell from 25.7% to 14.6%. See 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
14
 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, “Third Report on Estonia …” 
15
 According to Article 21.2 of the Language Act, “[t]he use of Estonian by companies, non-profit 
associations and foundations, by employees thereof and by sole proprietors is regulated if it is in the public 
interest, which, for the purposes of this Act, means public safety, public order, general government, public 
health, health protection, consumer protection and occupational safety. The establishment of requirements 
concerning proficiency in and use of Estonian shall be justified and in proportion to the objective being 
sought and shall not distort the nature of the rights which are restricted.” 
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speaking Autonomous Province of South Tyrol/Bolzano is a case in point; according to 
the 1972 Autonomy Statute, the province has a very high degree of financial autonomy 
from Rome and enjoys primary competence in decision making over sectors such as 
agriculture, tourism, the environment, public health and mining. Most of the funds for the 
province (85%) come from a fixed quota of direct and indirect taxes collected on the 
territory of the province, while just 15% of funds (the so-called ‘variable quota’) are 
disbursed after negotiations with Rome.16 As we shall see below, this high degree of 
autonomy has allowed Bolzano to negotiate the disbursement of EU Common 
Agricultural Policy funds and structural funds virtually independently of Rome. The 
effective use of these of these funds is probably the primary reason for the province’s 
current economic prosperity. 
Here we must clearly make the proviso that autonomy only works in economic terms if 
there are sufficient funds to back it up in terms of providing investment in the region’s 
infrastructure. Autonomy arrangements in which the autonomous region is unable to raise 
sufficient funds through taxation, through transfers from the national centre or through 
EU funding in order to exploit the opportunities for regional development often means 
that the autonomy arrangement will fail to provide economic opportunities either for the 
region as a whole or for the minority or minorities in question. 
Finally, the design of the electoral system, in particular whether a fully proportional 
electoral system is adopted or whether a more majoritarian system prevails, can also have 
a major impact on the economic opportunities for minorities. Probably the most vivid 
example of how the electoral system can impact upon minorities is that of Northern 
Ireland, from the establishment of the Stormont parliament in 1921 until its dissolution in 
1972. The decision to change the electoral system from a single transferable vote system 
to the British-style first past the post system in 1929, the gerrymandering of the local 
government electoral areas in order to ensure a unionist majority in councils in most of 
the main cities, as well as a lack of any other power-sharing mechanisms, meant that the 
Protestant (unionist) majority had total control of all levers of power throughout the 
                                                 
16
 Antony Alcock, “The South Tyrol Autonomy: a Short Introduction”, Booklet of the Autonomous 
Province of  Bozen/Bolzano, Bozen/Bolzano, County Londonderry, May 2001, at 
http://www.provinz.bz.it/lpa/autonomy/South-Tyrol%20Autonomy.pdf. 
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period in question. Over time, this led to the progressive economic marginalization of the 
Catholic minority, as Catholics were routinely excluded from professional and 
managerial posts in both the public and private sectors and levels of unemployment 
remained about twice as high amongst Catholics as amongst Protestants. Top posts in the 
senior civil service, the police and the judiciary have been virtually the exclusive preserve 
of the unionist majority (see below).17 
B.  Education 
Education policy can have a major impact on the economic status of national and ethnic 
minorities through its impact on employment. If members of minorities leave school or 
university with lower qualifications than their majority counterparts, their earning 
capacity in the long term is likely to be lower. Measures adopted within the sphere of 
education policy need to ensure that all citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origin, are 
operating on a level playing field. This can be a major issue if there is an official state 
language (or languages) and if, at the same time, circumstances dictate that a proportion 
of the population (i.e., members of national or ethnic minorities) are unable to speak this 
language. Under such conditions, members of minorities are likely to be disadvantaged 
economically unless there is an effective education policy that can ensure that all school 
leavers, irrespective of their ethnicity, know the state language. The other alternative is to 
promote bilingualism and to ensure that most or all citizens speak both the majority and 
the minority language. In both cases, an effective and well-funded education system is 
required. 
Out of our four cases, the only case in which a significant part of the population does not 
know the state language is that of Estonia. The aim of the Estonian authorities is to 
ensure that all Estonian citizens become fluent in Estonian. The 1993 Law on Basic and 
Upper Secondary Schools stipulated that, from 2000, the language of instruction in all 
upper secondary schools (in other words from the tenth year to the twelfth year of 
                                                 
17
 John Whyte, “How Much Discrimination was there under the Unionist Regime, 1921–1968?”, in Tom 
Gallagher and James O’Connell (eds.), Contemporary Irish Studies (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1983), also available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/whyte.htm; and the CAIN 
Web Service page, “Discrimination and Employment”, from Perspectives on Discrimination and Social 
Work in Northern Ireland, at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/discrimination/gibson2.htm#top.  
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education) would be Estonian. In practice, this would mean that at least 60% of 
instruction would be carried out in Estonian, even in those schools in which the language 
of instruction had hitherto been Russian. In 1997, the deadline was extended from 2000 
to 2007. 
From the mid-1990s, a concerted effort was made to teach Estonian in schools in which 
the language of instruction was Russian. In 1995, Estonian began to be taught to five and 
six year olds as a second language in pre-schools in which the main language was 
Russian. In 1996, Estonian began to be taught in all Russian-language primary schools 
from the first year. However, given that all upper secondary schools were to switch to 
Estonian by 2007, the pace did not appear to be fast enough and, in March 2000, the 
government of Estonia approved the State Integration Policy. The educational component 
of this policy aimed to ensure that all pupils graduating from elementary schools would 
have an intermediate level of Estonian, while those leaving secondary education would 
have acquired a degree of proficiency sufficient for everyday and occupational 
communication and for continuing to further studies in Estonian. Schools in mixed 
communities (more especially in Tallinn) adopted a method of total immersion in which 
Russian-speaking and Estonian-speaking students would study together in the same class, 
while in mono-ethnic Russian-speaking regions such as Ida-Virumaa, a more gradual 
approach was taken that was aimed at building up students’ vocabulary and grammar 
from the first year of primary school.18 
At the time of writing, it remains too early to judge the effectiveness of these measures. 
According to the 2000 census, 39% of those belonging to national minorities speak 
Estonian fluently. Amongst ethnic Russians, the figure is 38%, compared with just 15% 
in 1989.19 A part—but by no means all—of this improvement is due to the out-migration 
of some Russian-speakers in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, there is no more recent data 
that would help us to judge the effectiveness of the State Integration Policy. However, 
                                                 
18
 Kara Brown, “Integration through Education? The Russian-Speaking Minority and Estonian Society”, 
6(2) ISRE Newsletter (1997), at http://www.indiana.edu/~isre/NEWSLETTER/vol6no2/brown.htm. 
19
 See the 2000 Population Census of Estonia, at http://pub.stat.ee/px-
web.2001/I_Databas/Population_Census/Population_Census.asp; and Mart Rannut, “Language Planning in 
Estonia: Past and Present”, Mercator Working Paper No. 16 (2004), at 
http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/index-gb.htm. 
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some critics have accused the government of being ill-prepared for the 2007 transition in 
upper secondary schools and of not releasing sufficient funds for the creation of new 
Estonian texts and for teacher training.20 Despite improvements, even young Russian-
speakers still often struggle with the Estonian language and this can only have a negative 
impact on their employment prospects. 
In contrast, since the adoption of the 1972 Autonomy Statute, a bilingual policy has been 
in place in South Tyrol/Bolzano, whereby all public servants must be proficient in both 
Italian and German. This may even have benefited German-speakers disproportionately, 
as most could already speak Italian, while few Italian-speakers were able to speak 
German (thus, in the early 1980s, only 15% of Italian-speaking policemen were able to 
speak German).21 Nevertheless, the timeframe in which this was achieved was gradual, 
with bilingualism becoming the norm in most public bodies only in the 1990s. 
C.  The Role of Informal Networks 
Even when members of national and ethnic minorities enjoy equal rights from a legal 
point of view in terms of employment, social benefits and other economic goods, it may 
well be that, despite all the best efforts, they remain in a more marginal position 
economically and suffer from higher levels of unemployment and lower than average 
income. Very often, this is not the result of official regulations or state policy; rather, it is 
a consequence of a tendency amongst employers to ‘employ their own people’. Murray 
and Darby have identified such informal networks as a serious impediment to equal 
employment opportunities for Catholics in Northern Ireland, as often school-leavers find 
their first jobs with the help of (co-religionist) family members and friends. In the words 
of the chairman of the Fair Employment Agency:  
The informal networks which are still so powerful in Northern Ireland and 
through which so much employment is found, operate to maintain and 
reinforce employment patterns already established. Once these patterns 
have been established such a method of filling jobs means that, even if 
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there were never in Northern Ireland a single instance of individual 
discrimination in the future, the patterns laid down will remain much the 
same.
22
 
Informal networks play a particularly important role in weak or contested states. In such 
states (for example, in certain successor countries of the USSR and Yugoslavia), state 
power can become ‘privatized’—at least for a certain period of time—and the 
organizations that once constituted the state become the private realm of corrupt former 
state officials, black market businessmen and paramilitary groupings. Under such 
circumstances, the rules the state has hitherto sought to impose are replaced by the 
informal codes of local clans and networks. State regulation of the economy turns to 
black market regulation, as government departments and ministries are taken over by 
clans or criminal fraternities. Whatever is left of the state becomes a proliferation of 
semi-independent yet intertwined informal networks that deliver network goods to the 
few, rather than public goods to the many. As these networks are typically mono-ethnic, 
minorities can lose access to public goods that are traditionally provided by the state and 
can become excluded from all but the most basic economic activities. 
Even if state collapse is not total, an erosion of state authority leads to a corresponding 
erosion in the norms of public service and corruption becomes a normal way of life. 
Under such circumstances, members of national minorities, having fewer ‘protectors’ or 
‘patrons’ in high places in comparison with members of the majority nationality, are 
often disproportionately targeted by state officials, once again undermining their position 
in economic life. 
However, the use of informal networks to obtain economic benefits is also a survival 
strategy that is used by minorities as well as majorities. Smith and Wilson discuss the 
growth of a Russian business elite in Estonia in the 1990s, noting that “because it is also 
constrained by citizenship legislation from being a property owning class, it tends to 
operate on the margins of the legal market economy, which … makes it vulnerable in a 
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polity concerned about the growth of the black economy”.23 Similarly, as we shall see 
below, business networks that link the Hungarian community of Transylvania with 
Hungary itself have provided a valuable source of income for members of this minority. 
However, the problem of informal networks is that, while they often provide economic 
benefits to minority communities, they do little to foster social and economic integration 
between majorities and minorities. 
D.  Cross-Border Cooperation 
Cross-border trade is often a source of economic prosperity for minorities with a 
neighbouring kin-state. It is particularly beneficial to Hungarian communities in 
Transylvania, whose businesses regularly engage in trade with Hungary. Burgeoning 
trade ties between Hungary and Romania went hand in hand with Romania’s emergence 
from the deep recession of the early 1990s. Between 1993 and 2003, Romanian exports to 
Hungary rose from USD 86 million to USD 617 million, while imports rose from USD 
185 million to USD 869 million. Similarly, the number of Hungarian-owned ventures 
operating in Romania rose from 1,450 to 4,019 between 1995 and 2002 and the total 
capital stock belonging to these ventures rose from USD 20 million to USD 320 million 
over the same period.24 This clearly bolstered the economic opportunities of Hungarian 
communities within Romania, most notably within the stratum of Hungarian 
entrepreneurs in Transylvania. As we shall see below, Hungarian investments are 
particularly concentrated in counties of Transylvania with a high proportion of ethnic 
Hungarians. 
The increase in cross-border trade between Romania and Hungary was facilitated by 
gradually improving relations between the two countries as they prepared for eventual 
EU accession. During the early 1990s, the Romanian government harboured suspicions 
that the Hungarian side was supporting irredentism amongst Hungarian communities, 
although over time the two sides developed a normal working relationship. The 
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relationship between the two countries was regulated by a bilateral treaty signed between 
Romania and Hungary in 1996, which guaranteed the individual rights of the Hungarian 
minority in Romania. Later the same year the main Hungarian party in Romania, the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR), joined a coalition government 
led by Emil Constantinescu’s Romanian Democratic Convention, further facilitating 
bilateral relations between the two countries. 
The proximity of a kin-state for minorities does not, however, always mean that the 
minority will benefit economically from cross-border ties. In particular, any benefits are 
likely to be much less important if the kin-state is less developed economically than the 
host state or if trade relations between the two states decline. Here, the Estonian case is 
illustrative. Russians in Estonia have been largely unable to exploit their relationship with 
their ethnic kin in Russia by establishing trade relations with Russian businesses. First, in 
terms of GDP per capita, Russia is poorer than Estonia and therefore the potential of 
Russia as an investor and as a potential market for exports is less. Second, while Russia 
was the main trading partner of the Baltic republics within the internal market of the 
USSR and in 1991 still accounted for 45.9% of Estonian imports and 56.5% of exports,25 
by 2003 trade with Russia made up only 8.6% of imports and 3.9% of exports.26 
Moreover, cross-border trade with Russia did not necessarily bring economic prosperity, 
even to the border region; indeed, cheap Russian imports of food and alcohol undermine 
the local job market in the mainly Russian city of Narva.27 Finally, as the Baltic republics 
joined the EU in 2004, their trade tariffs with non-EU states (including Russia) had to 
conform with common EU tariffs. This was unlikely to improve trade ties with Russia or 
to foster opportunities for ethnic Russians in Estonia to forge economic ties with Russian 
partners. 
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An underlying reason why economic ties between Russians in Estonia and the Russian 
Federation have not been as strong as those between the Hungarian minority in 
Transylvania and Hungary has been that the Estonian government’s policy agenda and 
foreign policy orientation have opposed closer ties with Russia. Estonians believe that 
they were illegally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1940 and that their mission is to 
strive for closer integration with Europe, rather than to maintain strong economic 
relations with the former ‘occupier’. 
E.  Privatization 
In countries emerging from a system in which most or all economic life was controlled 
by the state, the transition to a market-led economy can be a traumatic one. In particular, 
the downsizing of the state sector and the closure of many industries that are no longer 
competitive in the global marketplace often leads to a deep economic recession and a 
rapid rise in unemployment rates. Members of national minorities can be affected by 
these changes disproportionately. A case in point is that of Russian speakers in Estonia. 
The Russian-speaking community in Estonia is mainly composed of those who arrived 
during the Soviet period to work in heavy industry, as well as their descendents. Ida-
Virumaa was Estonia’s industrial base during the Soviet period and Russians arrived to 
work in the power plants and textiles factories of Narva, the oil shale and chemicals 
industries in Kohtla-Jarve and the metallurgical chemical plant in Sillamae. A smaller 
number of Russian-speakers also came to work in the military sector and other 
government bodies. From 1959 to 1970, the population of Narva and Kohtla-Jarve more 
than doubled and the increase was mainly due to the arrival of Russians and other Soviet 
Slavs to work.28 In Kohtla-Jarve, the population of ethnic Estonians fell from 91.8% in 
1934 to 26.4% in 1979.29 The Russian-speaking population mixed little with Estonians in 
areas in which these new arrivals were concentrated and tended to live in separate areas 
in the suburbs of mixed cities. By the end of the Soviet period, Estonians and Russian 
speakers (mainly Russians, Ukrainians and Belarussians) basically constituted two 
parallel societies. 
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Following Estonian independence, it was those very same heavy industries in which the 
recent migrants worked that were unable to survive in the global market place. As the 
principles of the market economy took hold they faced closure, leading to widespread 
redundancies in industrial areas such as Ida-Virumaa, where the Russian minority was 
concentrated. Living standards amongst the Russian population, particularly in the 
northeast, fell even more steeply than they did amongst Estonians. Unemployment rose 
disproportionately amongst the mainly Russian population of the northeast and today 
remains at nearly double the level in the rest of the country. 
However, privatization does not necessarily affect members of national minorities 
negatively. In Transylvania, the number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is 
high in comparison with the rest of the country and is particularly high in settlements in 
which ethnic Hungarians live. According to reports from Romania’s National Centre for 
Sustainable Development, which is responsible for assisting the Romanian government 
and local authorities in developing the UNDP’s environmental project Local Agenda 21, 
out of 21 cities and municipalities across Romania for which data was available, the 
Hungarian city of Miercurea-Ciuc (Harghita county) and the mixed city of Targu-Mures 
(Mures county) took second and first place, respectively, in terms of the number of 
registered economic agents per capita in 2001.30 In Miercurea-Ciuc, there were 99 
economic agents per 1,000 population; in Targu-Mures, the figure was 135. Furthermore, 
in Miercurea-Ciuc, 270 out of 408 foreign investors were Hungarian, investing a total of 
USD 4.74 million (just over a third of all foreign capital invested).31 The vast majority of 
businesses were small businesses or family enterprises; 94.3% of economic agents in 
Miercurea-Ciuc had less than 9 employees. This attests to the entrepreneurial dynamism 
of many members of the Hungarian community, who took advantage of the free market 
after the collapse of communism by exploiting their relationship with co-ethnic friends, 
relatives and colleagues from across the border. The proximity of a kin-state for ethnic 
Hungarians in Transylvania has therefore given this community a relative advantage in 
adapting to free-market reforms by engaging in private business. 
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F.  Integration of Peripheral Regions into the National and Global Economy 
In some cases, minorities are economically disadvantaged because they are concentrated 
in the more peripheral regions of the country. Peripheral regions that are economically 
isolated from the capital and other main economic centres tend to be underdeveloped, 
irrespective of the ethnicity of their populations. High disparities in living standards 
between the capital city and peripheral communities are particularly prevalent in parts of 
Southern and Eastern Europe. Here, Romania and Estonia are clear examples of this 
phenomenon, as GDP per capita in the poorest regions of these countries amounts to 
around a third of that in the capital city. The process of economic integration of 
peripheral communities first into the national economy and later into the global economy 
can lead to economic hardship and poverty. In such a process, minority communities may 
find it doubly hard to integrate—firstly, as inhabitants of a peripheral region and, 
secondly, as minorities. Geographical remoteness from the hub of economic life together 
with difficulties in integrating linguistically and/or culturally may combine to produce a 
greater degree of marginalization than would be the case if only one of these factors 
applied.  
Peripheral regions are those that cannot easily be integrated into the national and global 
economies. Often, this is because they are rural regions with low levels of 
industrialization and an underdeveloped infrastructure. However, as the case of Ida-
Virumaa in Estonia shows, peripheral regions are not always rural regions. Northeast 
Estonia is a peripheral region, not because it is rural but because its industries are no 
longer competitive in the global marketplace and because many of its inhabitants are 
unable to speak Estonian, are less mobile in terms of seeking work in monolingual 
(Estonian) regions of the country and therefore find it difficult to become fully integrated 
into the national economy. Generally speaking, peripheral communities are adversely 
affected by rapid economic change, such as that brought about by privatization and free 
market reforms and by globalization more generally. 
Globalization, too, is a process that affects minority communities in different ways in 
different contexts. The different niches that national minorities occupy in the labour 
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market and the various cross-border networks they may be able to exploit mean that they 
can be affected in a number of different ways by the process of globalization. This leads 
to differing and uncertain outcomes. While the heavy industries in which many of 
Estonia’s Russians worked became non-competitive and obsolete, so Transylvania’s 
textile factories—which employed many ethnic Hungarians—were able to find a niche in 
a wider European market. After entering a period of profound crisis in the early 1990s, 
the industry began to attract interest from investors in Hungary and Western Europe and 
began to recover. By 1999, Romania had overtaken Poland as the leading garment 
production partner for the European Union.32 
G.  EU-ization and EU Regional Policy 
The main aspects of EU policy that are relevant to geographically concentrated and trans-
border minorities are, firstly, the disbursement of structural funds for regional 
development and, secondly, the creation of the single European market and the 
dismantling of border restrictions in terms of free movement and trade. As to the first 
aspect, in 1988 far-reaching reforms were carried out in regard to the way in which EU 
(then EEC) structural funds were allocated and, henceforth, regions were to play a greater 
role in absorbing certain structural funds. Specifically, funds were to be allocated to the 
following objectives: development of least prosperous regions (objective 1); restructuring 
industry in regions subject to industrial decline (objective 2); combating long-term 
unemployment and opening up employment pathways for young people (objective 3); 
facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial change (objective 4); adaptation of 
agricultural structures (objective 5a); and development of rural areas (objective 5b). 
Funds under objectives 1, 2 and 5b were to be allocated to the regions and allocation of 
objective 1 funds was mainly limited to regions with a GDP of 75% or less of the 
Community average. The regional aspect of EEC funding had already been introduced in 
a rather ad hoc fashion in 1977, when four regions—Greenland, the French Overseas 
Departments, Northern Ireland and the Italian Mezzogiorno—together with Ireland were 
given a special grant and were subsequently designated absolute priority regions. In 1985, 
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the list of absolute priority regions was extended to include Portugal and some Spanish 
regions. It was only in 1988, however, that EEC funding to the regions became 
institutionalized. 
The 1988 reforms also for the first time incorporated the Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS) into Community legislation. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
2052/88 of 24 June 1988 made the three-tier NUTS classification system the basis for 
allocating funds at the regional level; specifically, objective 1 funding was allocated to 
the NUTS II level and objective 2 funding was mainly directed towards the NUTS III 
level. NUTS had already been established in 1981 as a tool for collecting regional 
statistics but this was the first time it was used as an instrument of EEC policy. 
The regionalization of the EEC/EU and the allocation of structural funds according to 
regional criteria meant that member states had to submit plans for structural funds at the 
regional level and this gave room for local actors to have a greater say in the allocation of 
these funds. Actors in regions that already enjoyed some kind of regional autonomy were 
in an ideal position to take advantage of these changes. This applied above all to South 
Tyrol, where the government of the Autonomous Province was able to take action to 
adapt Community law in areas in which it had primary competence, such as agriculture, 
tourism and the environment (see above), without interference from Rome. This meant 
that it had considerable control over the disbursement of structural funds allocated 
according to objective 5b (and, later, objective 2, after objective 5b was redefined in 
2000), which was South Tyrol’s main source of structural funds. The result was increased 
dialogue between the local authorities and Brussels, leading to South Tyrol’s decision to 
establish a joint regional office in Brussels with the neighbouring Italian province of 
Trentino and the land of North Tyrol in 1995, the first regional government in the EU to 
do so. 
The increased relevance of the regions in terms of EU policy was instrumental in the 
establishment and subsequent strengthening of the EU’s Committee of the Regions 
(CoR), made up of over two hundred representatives from Europe’s regions. Established 
in 1994 after the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, the CoR had its competences 
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extended further by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. The president of South Tyrol 
participates directly in the CoR, further cementing the ties between Bolzano and Brussels. 
In South Tyrol, direct cooperation with EU structures against the backdrop of a high 
degree of autonomy in deciding how structural funds are to be disbursed has allowed this 
predominantly German-speaking region to prioritize and set its own development agenda. 
This has clearly improved the region’s efficiency in terms of utilizing structural funds. 
EEC/EU funds have made a major contribution to the economic development of the 
region, first through the EEC’s Common Agricultural Policy in the 1970s and 1980s 
(based on the fact that South Tyrol was a mountainous region with particular agricultural 
needs) and, later, through objectives 5a, 2 and INTERREG.33 Cooperation between the 
South Tyrol region and Brussels in this respect serves as an example of good practice. 
However, EU structural funds and the EU’s policy of regionalization only provide 
opportunities for autonomous development if the state gives the necessary degree of 
autonomy for the region to prioritize how it uses EU structural funds. This was not the 
case in Romania. As it looked towards future EU membership, in 1998 the Romanian 
government passed a law establishing eight ‘Development Regions’, which would 
become NUTS II regions of the EU, for the purposes of receiving EU structural funds. 
With the help of the EU’s PHARE programme, Romania also established a Regional 
Development Council (RDC) and a Regional Development Agency (RDA) in each 
Development Region, as well as a National Council for Regional Development and a 
National Fund for Regional Development to coordinate its regional policy. Prior to 
Romania’s joining the EU, PHARE pre-accession funds were administered jointly by the 
Romanian Ministry of Development and Prognosis and by the RDAs. The overall aim of 
the regional development strategy was to reduce disparities in economic development 
between the Development Regions. 
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The Development Regions were, however, created by the centre and did not take into 
account historical and cultural factors. Moreover, no body at the level of the 
Development Region was elected: the RDCs consist of representatives appointed from 
the lower (county) level while the RDAs are professional executive bodies. The 
Hungarian community in Transylvania, in particular, viewed the Development Regions as 
artificial and called for the establishment of a region that corresponded more closely to 
their pattern of habitation. In December 2006, Hungarian mayors from local councils in 
the counties of Covasna, Harghita and Mures announced the formation of a ‘Szekeler’s 
region’, which they hoped would unite representatives of the three counties and would 
better promote their economic development.34 
Several commentators have pointed out that the over-centralization of Romania’s 
regional development programme has undermined its effectiveness. Mungiu Pippidi 
points to four main failings of Romanian regional development institutions: a lack of 
fiscal autonomy at RDA level; the interference of political actors in the allocation of EU 
pre-accession funds; a deficit in human and material resources; and problems of 
communication between regional institutions.35 Indeed, the policy has failed to fulfil its 
declared goal of reducing economic discrepancies between regions. On the contrary, 
between 1999 and 2004, regional divergencies widened still further; in particular, 
according to EUROSTAT, GDP per capita in the northeast region fell from the national 
average in 1999 to just 69% of the national average in 2004. Similarly, GDP per capita in 
the richest region, Bucharest, rose from 165% of the national average in 1999 to 190% in 
2004.36 Generally speaking, however, it was less developed mono-ethnic (Romanian) 
regions (such as the northeast) that suffered the most, while the Hungarian regions 
maintained an average or above average level of development.  
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The other major impact of evolving EU policy on regionally concentrated national 
minorities relates to the increased free movement of commodities and individuals across 
the internal borders of the EU. In particular, the Single European Act, which came into 
force in 1987, and the subsequent creation of a single market with the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty allowed mobility of the workforce across the EEC/EU. Moreover, the signing of 
the Schengen Agreement between Belgium, France, West Germany, the Netherlands and 
Luxemburg in 1985 and the subsequent implementation of the Agreement in 13 member 
states (1995–2001) led to the abolition of border controls and the free movement of 
people. South Tyrol/Bolzano was able to take advantage of these changes quite rapidly in 
the mid-1990s; Austria’s accession to the EU in 1995 (and hence to the single market) 
and its implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1997 boosted bilateral economic 
ties between South Tyrol and the Austrian Land of North Tyrol in terms of increased 
trade and tourism. Finally, the introduction of the Euro as a common currency in both 
Italy and Austria in 2002 further facilitated cross-border trade and free movement of 
goods and capital between these two regions. 
H.  Proportionality and Ethnic Quotas in Employment 
Although amending language laws and education laws, as well as introducing more laws 
that prevent discrimination in the workplace, may go some way towards providing 
members of minorities with equal employment opportunities, this may in itself not be 
sufficient, given the prevalence of ingrained informal practices (see above). In certain 
contexts, it has been deemed necessary to introduce a policy of affirmative action in 
sectors in which inequalities in job opportunities are particularly severe. This applies 
above all to the civil service, where the government has direct leverage over recruitment 
practices and where majority dominance can result in minorities being economically 
disadvantaged, not only within the context of the civil service but also within other 
spheres that are affected by the decisions made in public bodies. One approach that can 
be employed is to introduce quotas for certain groups; such an approach was adopted for 
civil service recruitment in SouthTyrol/Bolzano within the terms of the Second 
Autonomy Statute of 1972, based on the so-called ‘Package’ of autonomy measures for 
South Tyrol, signed by the Italian and Austrian governments in 1969. 
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Prior to the Autonomy Statute, the Italian-speaking population of the Province of South 
Tyrol/Bolzano held disproportionately more state posts than the other linguistic 
communities and this had become one of the central elements of the dispute that 
sporadically led to low-level violence in the 1950s and 1960s. When the Autonomy 
Statute came into effect in 1972, less than 10% of civil servants in the state 
administration were German- or Ladin-speakers.37 In the words of Alcock, “all the levers 
of job mobility were in the hands of the state or Italian-dominated region [i.e., Trentino-
Alto Adige]”.38 However, the Autonomy Statute introduced ethnic proportions to ensure 
the proportional representation of Italian, German and Ladin-speakers in all state bodies 
in the province, with the exception of the Ministry of Defence and certain police forces, 
and a later law extended this principle to all provincial offices.39 These posts amounted to 
nearly 90% of all public employment, although a time period of 30 years was set for the 
measure to be fully implemented. Gradually, ethnic paricipation in these bodies became 
more proportional and, by the end of the 30-year period, 69.2% of posts in the civil 
service were held by German-speakers, 27.3% by Italian speakers and 3.5% by Ladin-
speakers—almost exactly the same as their proportions amongst the population at large.40 
Indeed, by the late 1990s, as tourism took off in the mainly German and Ladin-speaking 
rural areas of the province, it was the Italian community that was complaining about 
discrimination in employment.41 For the German and Ladin-speaking communities, 
however, it can be said that the introduction of quotas was an effective means of reducing 
economic inequalities. 
Similar, if more tentative, efforts were made to ensure proportionality of employment 
between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, 
unemployment has traditionally been higher than in the rest of the United Kingdom and is 
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concentrated in working-class enclaves of Belfast and other major cities. Although there 
are such Protestant enclaves as well as Catholic enclaves, there are more of the latter than 
the former and, at least until the 1990s, unemployment rates among Catholics were 
consistently more than twice that of Protestants; in the mid-1980s, the male 
unemployment rate for Catholics reached around 35%, compared to around 15% for 
Protestants.42 Additionally, certain key positions, such as top posts in the civil service and 
managerial posts were traditionally dominated by Protestants.43 
The first serious attempt to address these disparities was made in 1976 with the Fair 
Employment Act (NI). The Fair Employment Act made it “unlawful in relation to 
employment or occupations, to discriminate on grounds of religion or political belief; to 
engage in any victimization of persons, publication of discriminatory advertisements; and 
to incite anyone to commit an act of unlawful discrimination”. The Act also brought into 
existence the Fair Employment Agency (FEA), which was tasked with fighting 
discrimination and encouraging affirmative action. In particular, the FEA provided 
employers with a Code of Practice and asked them to sign a declaration committing 
themselves to the principle of equal opportunities. Although the FEA had the power to 
investigate complaints of discrimination and even bring offenders to court, few checks 
were made on employers to make sure they were abiding by the principles of the 
declaration even if they had signed it. Moreover, the onus rested on employees to prove 
discrimination at the work place and very few cases were submitted to a tribunal.44 Given 
the fact that differences in the rate of unemployment between Protestants and Catholics 
throughout the 1980s remained more or less unchanged, it appears that the Fair 
Employment Act (NI) of 1976 had little substantive effect. 
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Somewhat more effective was the Fair Employment Act (NI) of 1989, which went much 
further by introducing compulsory monitoring of the religious composition of the 
workforce for all firms, public and private, that employed more than ten employees at any 
one time (as of 1992). The Fair Employment Act was implemented through the Fair 
Employment Commission (FEC), which was far more proactive than the FEA and had 
the power to monitor and examine work practices. From 1999, the work of the FEC was 
taken over by the Equality Commission (EC) for Northern Ireland.45 Failure on the part 
of firms to submit data to the FEC/EC on the composition of their workforce would result 
in conviction and a fine. The new Act also made indirect discrimination illegal.46 The 
requirement for firms to provide data on their workforce was extended to part-time 
workers in 1998 with the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order, 
providing they worked at least 16 hours per week. Finally, Section 75 of the Northern 
Ireland Act of 1998 imposes a statutory duty on public authorities to “have due regard to 
the need to promote equality of opportunity … between persons of different religious 
belief, political opinion, racial group, age, marital status or sexual orientation.” 
It would appear that the implementation of the Fair Employment Act (NI) of 1989 did 
indeed have an impact on reducing differentials in the workplace between Protestants and 
Catholics. After employment differentials remained more or less static during the 1970s 
and 1980s, the pattern began to change in the 1990s. While, in 1990, 34.6% of those 
employed in firms in the private sector with a workforce of more than 25 were Catholics, 
by 2005 the figure had risen to 41.5%. Similarly, during the same period, the proportion 
of civil servants who were Catholics rose from 37.2% to 47.9%.47 Despite this positive 
change, however, differentials in the unemployment rate remained; in 2003, 
unemployment amongst Catholics stood at 8.3%, compared to 4.3% among Protestants.48 
In part, therefore, the higher employment rate amongst Catholics was the result of the 
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general economic upturn, brought about by the paramilitary ceasefires of the mid-1990s, 
often known as the ‘peace dividend’, and by rapid economic growth in the Republic of 
Ireland. However, it is likely that the implementation of the 1989 Fair Employment Act 
also played a major role. Both the case of South Tyrol and the case of Northern Ireland 
therefore show that policies to ensure proportional representation in the workplace, 
provided they are implemented energetically, can be effective in promoting equal 
economic opportunities. 
I.  The Need for Data 
The cases of Northern Ireland and South Tyrol that were the subject of discussion in the 
previous section highlight how important it is to have reliable data on the extent to which 
members of minorities are excluded from public life, especially in terms of employment. 
In the case of Northern Ireland, in particular, the authorities were only really able to get a 
grip on the problem of inadvertent discrimination against Catholics (probably as a result 
of employing ‘one’s own people’ or using informal networks as a means of employment) 
by monitoring employment practices right down to the level of the smallest firms. Only 
on the basis of such information can effective policies be developed to redress 
imbalances in employment or income. 
The need for accurate data is also relevant with respect to EU policy, especially as 
regards the EU’s current efforts to combat social exclusion. Following the Lisbon summit 
in 2000, which marked the start of the so-called ‘Lisbon strategy’ to make the EU 
economy more competitive and dynamic, the need to combat social exclusion within the 
EU was given greater priority. Within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy, in 2001, the 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union launched a programme of 
Community action to encourage member states to combat social exclusion. Through this 
programme, all EU member states (including Bulgaria and Romania from 2006) agreed 
to draft National Action Plans (NAPs) with strategies on how to overcome this problem. 
This new emphasis could potentially be used as a tool to fight the economic 
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marginalization of minorities; however, the problem of exclusion of national minorities 
(especially autochthonous minorities) has yet to feature highly as part of this initiative.49 
Part of this problem is that the EU has no information as to the extent to which minorities 
do, in fact, suffer from social or economic exclusion. Although the NAPs that each 
country is expected to submit within the framework of the EU’s social inclusion policy 
are meant to include a set of indicators of social exclusion (the so-called ‘Laeken 
indicators’), including poverty rates and thresholds, income distribution, unemployment, 
rates of early school leaving and low literacy, as well as life expectancy and health data, 
there is no requirement to disaggregate this data according to ethnic affiliation. As many 
commentators have pointed out, including representatives of the EU itself, the lack of 
disaggregated data makes it difficult for the EU and EU member states to identify the 
socio-economic problems that are specific to minority communities and still harder for 
them to devise a policy framework to deal with them.50 
III. Conclusion 
The four case studies presented here demonstrate clearly how economic development in 
regions in which minorities are concentrated sets the framework for peaceful coexistence, 
cooperation and democratic development in multi-ethnic societies. In South 
Tyrol/Bolzano, despite a history of sporadic violence in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
possibility of such incidents being repeated today is almost inconceivable and this is due, 
in part at least, to increased economic prosperity in general and to greater economic 
equality between the communities in particular. Similarly, the reduction of interethnic 
tensions between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania after the fall of 
communism, which had culminated in a violent incident in the town of Targu-Mures in 
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1990, has gone hand in hand with a gradual increase in economic prosperity, which 
Hungarians have shared in just as much as Romanians. Even in Estonia, where some 
Russian-speakers remain economically disadvantaged in comparison with their Estonian 
counterparts, the fact that they have enjoyed higher living standards than their co-ethnic 
brethren in the Russian Federation has proved a formidable counterweight to Russian 
irredentism. Finally, in Northern Ireland, increased economic prosperity has gone hand in 
hand with a reduction of tensions and an end to violence, although it remains unclear in 
which direction the arrow of causality points. 
Of course, economic factors are not the only factors that have helped promote inter-ethnic 
harmony, stability and democracy. Political factors have also played a role. Thus, in 
Northern Ireland the close political relationship that developed between the British and 
Irish governments during the late 1990s and early 2000s facilitated the peace process and 
paved the way towards the power-sharing arrangement that eventually took hold in 2007. 
Similarly, in Romania the prospects for political dialogue improved markedly in 1996 
with the entry of the DAHR into the governing coalition (see above). However, in most 
of our cases the prospects for political dialogue have been enhanced by more favourable 
economic circumstances for the region in general and for the relevant minority in 
particular. 
In Section II, a number of factors were identified that, in part at least, determine the 
extent to which members of ethnic and national minorities enjoy the same economic 
opportunities as their majority counterparts in four sub-national regions of Europe. From 
this analysis, we can draw the following (tentative) conclusions. First of all, the context 
in which minorities live is especially important. The effects of rapid economic change in 
the context of privatization illustrate this best. Due to their geographical proximity to 
Hungary and the establishment of cross-border networks with the neighbouring state, 
Hungarians in Transylvania fared relatively well as a result of privatization in comparison 
with their Romanian counterparts. However, the same could not be said for Russians in 
Estonia’s Ida Virumaa, due to the fact that most Russians were working in the very same 
heavy industries that were worst hit by privatization and market reforms. These industries 
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were decimated when the highly centralized internal market of the USSR collapsed, as 
they were not competitive in the global marketplace. 
Rapid economic change is therefore likely to affect all minorities differently. One group 
that is likely to be affected particularly negatively is the Roma. Given the fact that Roms 
tend to be marginalized anyway, all economic restructuring that leads to higher 
unemployment often affects Roms first as often they are first to lose their jobs. Here, a 
comment by Alan Philips, the current President of the Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, on the effects on the 
Roma community of downsizing the state sector is illustrative. According to Phillips, 
members of this group who previously carried out menial functions within state bodies 
“were made redundant and changed from being impoverished to being destitute”.51 
One more example of how contextual factors can determine how minorities are affected 
by different institutional arrangements is the way the territorial-administrative structure 
of the state affects the economic opportunities of minorities. Thus, in South 
Tyrol/Bolzano, the establishment of an autonomous province seemed like an ideal 
mechanism to help secure the economic rights of the German-speaking community. 
However, this is because German-speakers are compactly settled in this region in a way 
that is quite unlike the rest of Italy and an autonomy solution is therefore feasible. Such a 
solution would not, however, be feasible for minorities that are geographically dispersed, 
such as the Roma. 
Another key factor is the presence or absence of a kin-state and the relationship between 
the host state in which the minority lives and that kin-state. As has already been 
mentioned, Hungarians in Transylvania drew great benefit economically from economic 
relations with their kin-state, Hungary. Similarly, the close political and economic ties 
forged between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland during the Blair and 
Ahern administrations, combined with the rapid economic growth in the Republic, had 
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significant (positive) ramifications for economic prosperity in Northern Ireland, both in 
general and for Catholic communities in particular. The same can be said for the German-
speaking population of South Tyrol/Bolzano, who developed ever greater ties with their 
neighbours from the Land of North Tyrol in Austria as both Italy and Austria integrated 
more into the European Union, removing border controls and adopting a single currency. 
The relationship with the kin-state did not, however, work well for the Russians in 
Estonia, given the sometimes difficult relationship between Russia and Estonia, declining 
trade relations between the two countries as Estonia prepared to join the EU and Russia’s 
relative poverty in comparison with Estonia. At the same time, Estonia’s relative wealth 
had a positive impact on the integration of the Russian minority in that it discouraged 
Estonia’s Russians from seeking irredentist solutions and encouraged them to participate 
in Estonian public life, rather than join Russia. 
The fact that the impact of different institutional designs and different economic models 
are context-dependent means that policies to combat the economic exclusion of 
minorities need to be very carefully tailored to suit the particular circumstances in which 
the given minority lives. This means that there can be no ‘catch all’ package of policies 
that can be used for all cases. At best, we can come up with a series of general principles 
that will need to be adapted according to historical, geographical and political 
circumstances. 
The second conclusion that we can draw is that EU regionalization through the 
disbursement of structural funds to regions only has an impact when the regions 
demarcated (i.e., NUTS regions) in some way correspond to the historical identities of 
those who live there and are backed up by extensive regional self-government. Through 
its far-reaching level of autonomy, the region of South Tyrol/Bolzano was able to exploit 
the structural funds it received from the EU in the most productive manner possible by 
exercising wide discretion over how they were allocated and even negotiating directly 
with Brussels. In Romania’s Development Regions, however, EU structural funds had 
little impact, firstly, because these regions had little or no correspondence with any pre-
existing regional identities and, secondly, because the highly centralized unitary state of 
Romania gave the regions little real power over how these funds were to be disbursed. 
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Thirdly, we saw how the introduction of ethnic quotas in the civil service and/or active 
monitoring of the proportion of minorities employed in public and private firms, coupled 
with the likelihood of intervention in the case of active or passive discrimination, had a 
real impact on the number of members of minorities employed in different sectors in both 
South Tyrol/Bolzano and Northern Ireland. It must be stressed, however, that in order to 
be effective, this policy must be applied robustly and not be limited to a simple 
prohibition of discrimination, as was the case with the 1976 Fair Employment Act (NI). 
Employment differentials between communities are maintained far more by informal 
practices, such as drawing from one’s own informal network of ‘like-minded people’, 
than from active discrimination. Only rather intrusive intervention that even goes as far as 
affirmative action can overcome this ‘inadvertent discrimination’. 
Finally, the abovementioned need for close monitoring underscores the need to obtain 
accurate data about the economic circumstances of members of national and ethnic 
minorities. This is particularly relevant in the context of the EU’s ever-growing interest in 
issues of social inclusion. Well-informed policies to tackle the problem of social and 
economic exclusion and marginalization of minorities are only possible if we have 
accurate socio-economic indicators across Europe that are disaggregated according to 
ethnicity. This was highlighted by the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in their Opinion on Germany (1 
March 2002). According to the Opinion “[t]he lack of good statistical data makes it 
difficult for the German authorities to ensure that the full and effective equality of 
national minorities is promoted effectively”. In particular, the absence of such data makes 
it impossible for the authorities to evaluate the unemployment rate for each national 
minority.52 
The list of factors outlined in this paper that impact upon the relative economic status of 
minorities is far from exhaustive. The factors discussed in Part II were those that emerged 
from the particular cases that were under the spotlight. However, there are many other 
factors in other contexts that may affect the participation of minorities in the national and 
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global economies. In particular, it is not only external phenomena such as sudden 
economic change or the institutional and legal framework of a country or region that 
matter, factors that are intrinsic to certain communities matter as well. These relate to a 
given community’s perception of itself within its social environment, which are formed 
over generations. In the past, this perception was typically framed by what is sometimes 
known as the ethnic specialization of labour, according to which certain nationalities 
filled different economic niches. This meant that many ethnic communities came to hold 
particular expectations about their role in society. While the ethnic specialization of 
labour strictu sensu mainly broke down in the twentieth century, many members of 
Romani communities in much of Europe are still consigned to menial forms of 
employment, remain unemployed or eke out a living on the black market. Low social and 
professional expectations amongst Roms impact negatively upon their educational 
qualifications and achievements and undermine the economic prospects of this group. 
This is partly due to expectations of social status that are passed down from generation to 
generation within the community and partly due to the attitudes held by non-Roma within 
the education system, who often stereotype Roms as underachievers. Whatever the case, 
the example of Roms shows that social expectations—both those of minorities and those 
of majorities—can have a crucial impact on the economic prosperity of the former. 
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